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Informational social influence theory posits that under conditions of uncertainty, we are inclined to look to others for advice. This leaves
us remarkably vulnerable to being influenced by others’ opinions or advice. Rational agents, however, do not blindly seek and act on
arbitrary information, but often consider the quality of its source before committing to a course of action. Here, we ask the question of
whether a collaborator’s reputation can increase their social influence and, in turn, bias perception and anxiety under changing levels of
uncertainty. Human male and female participants were asked to provide estimations of dot direction using the random dot motion
(RDM) perceptual discrimination task and were paired with transient collaborators of high or low reputation whom provided their own
estimations. The RDM varied in degrees of uncertainty and joint performance accuracy was linked to risk of an electric shock. Despite
providing identical information, we show that collaborating with a high reputation compared with a low reputation partner, led to
significantly more conformity during the RDM task for uncertain perceptual decisions. Consequently, high reputation partners de-
creased the subjects’ anxiety during the anticipatory shock periods. fMRI data showed that parametric changes in conformity resulted in
increased activity in the ventromedial PFC, whereas dissent was associated with increased in activity in the dorsal anterior cingulate
cortex (dACC). Furthermore, the dACC and insula, regions involved in anticipatory pain, were significantly more active when collabo-
rating with a low reputation partner. These results suggest that information about reputation can influence both cognitive and affective
processes and in turn alter the neural circuits that underlie decision-making and emotion.
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Introduction
According to psychological theory, when we are uncertain about
what actions to take, we often look to others to guide our deci-
sions (Cialdini, 1993; Wooten and Reed, 1998). In turn, this
leaves us remarkably vulnerable to being influenced by others’
opinions or advice. This is common in daily life as important
decisions are often based on limited information, and under such
circumstances, we often look to the advice of others whom we
have a high regard for, namely those with a good reputation.
Supporting the conjecture that reputation can have a potent in-
fluence on social behavior is research showing that we are highly
sensitive to the reputation and the competence of others when
making decisions (Todorov et al., 2005; Boorman et al., 2013;
Tedeschi et al., 2015). Further, classic social psychological exper-
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Significance Statement
Humans look to others for advice when making decisions under uncertainty. Rational agents, however, do not blindly seek
information, but often consider the quality of its source before committing to a course of action. Here, we ask the question of
whether a collaborators’ reputation can increase social influence and in turn bias perception and anxiety in the context of
perceptual uncertainty. We show that when subjects are partnered with collaborators with a high reputation, this leads to in-
creased conformity during uncertain perceptual decision-making and reduces anxiety when joint performance accuracy leads to
an electric shock. Furthermore, our results show that information about reputation alters the neural circuits that underlie
decision-making and emotion.
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iments demonstrate subjects’ susceptibility to conforming, that is
changing one’s behavior to match opinions and actions
of others (Sherif, 1935; Schachter, 1951; Asch, 1956; Cialdini and
Goldstein, 2004) is especially evident when the influencer is high
in authority or reputation (Milgram, 1964). Despite this large
body of research, no studies have yet attempted to understand
how the reputation of others can modulate social influences on
perceptual discrimination.
The information we garner from reputable others and how it
influences our decisions become critical when it relates to deci-
sion outcomes that result in physical harm. For example, cage-
rearedmonkeyswho are not afraid of snakes instantly exhibit fear
after they observe another conspecific exhibit fear of snakes
(Mineka and Cook, 1986). It is known that, in general, the mere
presence of a conspecific can ameliorate an individual’s response
to a stressor, a phenomenon called “social buffering” (Kikusui et
al., 2006). The identity of the present conspecific can also change
the strength of the buffering response. For
example, holding the hand of a romantic
partner during the anticipation of a possi-
ble electric shock reduced the neural pain
responses (Coan et al., 2006). Others have
shown that when the risk of a shock de-
pends on the task performance of another
person, the level of perceived competence
extracted from facial features modulates
both subjective and neural measures of
anxiety (Tedeschi et al., 2015). Theories of
such findings (Beckes and Coan, 2011;
Krahe´ et al., 2013) posit that conspecifics
reduce threat responses if they offer pro-
tective resources that factor into predic-
tive computations of threat severity. Little
is known, however, about what properties
of conspecifics, such as wisdom, experi-
ence, competence, or reputation, modu-
late social buffering.
To explore the relationship between
reputation, perceptual bias and emotion,
we used functional MRI in conjunction
with a standard random dot motion
(RDM) discrimination task to test
whether partners high or low in reputa-
tionwouldmodulate perceptual decisions
and anxiety of the subject. To create rep-
utation ratings of the partners, subjects
were shown the average ratings of each
partner made by their friends [rounded
off to either 1 (low), 3 (mid), and 5 (high)
reputation]. Because perception and anx-
iety both rely heavily on expectations to
inform interpretations of ambiguous
stimuli (Petrovic et al., 2005; Sterzer et al.,
2008), we hypothesized that a partner’s
reputation would play a significant role
determining the degree of social influence
on perception and anxiety. In the task,
healthy subjects were provided with RDM
estimates by transient collaborators of
high or low reputation. The subject’s goal
was to make RDM estimates based on
their own judgements and where needed,
incorporate the RDM estimates of the
transient collaborator (Fig. 1). The likelihood of an electric shock
at the end of each block is based ostensibly on combined task
performance. We show that RepHigh partners induce greater lev-
els of social influence (i.e., conformity) during the RDMdiscrim-
ination task, especially for the uncertain conditions and down-
regulate subjective and neural markers of anxiety.
Materials andMethods
Participants. Twenty-five individuals recruited from the Columbia Uni-
versity community completed all parts of the experiment. Data from
three participants were removed due to excessive head motion during
scanning (1) or technical issues (shocks not working; 2), and all remain-
ing analyses are based on the remaining 22 individuals (10 females, mean
age 25.6 4.6, range 19–35). All participants were right-handed, had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, had no history of neurological or
psychiatric illness, and gave written informed consent for participation.
The study was approved by the Institutional Review Board of Columbia
University.
Figure1. Taskparadigmandbehavioral results.A, Experimental steps: the subjectwas first shownapictureof thepartner’s face
and reputation (1 star RepLow or 5 stars RepHigh). Next, the subject was shown two screens: (1) an arrow indicating the
partner’s guess about the direction of the dots (arrow screen) and (2) their guess about the coherence percentage (30% in the
example). The subject then saw a screen showing the dot movement and was asked to guess the coherence percentage (using a
slider scale). The RDM discrimination estimation was repeated three times. Next, subjects reported how anxious they feel at the
prospect of receive a shock during the 4–6 s anticipation screen. The likelihood of receiving a shock was based on the joint
performance accuracy between the subject and thepartner. After the shock anticipation screen, they either received a shock or not.
Then they sawa screendisplaying information about the joint performanceof themselves and thepartner. The red-borderedboxes
are the analyzed events.B, Left, Conformity was higher for high-reputation partners. Right, Mean conformity differed across hard
and ambiguous (uncertain), but not easy conditions. *p .001.
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Experimental paradigm. The experiment consisted of a 42 min session
consisting of 48 blocks. In each block (Fig. 1), the participant was paired
upwith a new “partner”, or someonewhoostensibly played the same task
on a previous visit to the psychology department. At the beginning of
each block, the participant was presented with a picture of that partner
along with a star rating below. The pictured partners had neutral facial
expressions, were edited to an identical size and brightness, and were
unfamiliar to subjects (as confirmed in a debriefing questionnaire). Con-
founds such as attractiveness, trustworthiness, gender, race, and the like
were minimized by counterbalancing the faces across subjects.
Implicit competence was controlled for by using ratings from inde-
pendent samples of raters from the same subject population (frommul-
tiple samples, total N  91). Raters judged each partner’s competence
based solely on the partner’s picture (Tedeschi et al., 2015). Ratings were
trifurcated into 1, 3, or 5 stars (with more stars indicating better judged
competence). Participants were instructed that the ratings were an aver-
age from the partners’ friends’ judgments of their general skill at percep-
tual, cognitive, or “mind training” games. This was made more realistic
by asking the subject to give the names of friends who could rate them on
their perceptual and cognitive abilities and by taking a photograph for
future participants in the experiment. Before starting the task each par-
ticipant was randomly assigned to one of two counterbalanced sets of
pairings between partner pictures and reputation ratings. After viewing
the partner’s picture and star rating for 3 s at the start of the block, the star
rating disappeared and a small thumbnail picture of the partner re-
mained in a screen corner. There were also four blocks (2 in each session)
without a partner; in those blocks the partner’s picture and rating were
replaced with “no partner” text.
After the 3 s partner and rating presentation, a 2–4 s jittered ISI oc-
curred before the perception task began. The goal for participants was to
make accurate perceptual judgments (3 per block) of the direction and
level of motion coherence in the RDM discrimination task. The RDM
discrimination task is a standard psychophysical stimulus used to study
motion perception (Newsome et al., 1989; Raymond, 2000). In the RDM,
most dots on the screen move in random directions but a portion of the
total dots move coherently together either left or right. Coherence levels
ranged from 0 to 40%, indicating the percentage of all dots on the screen
that are moving together. Participants must judge whether the coherent
dots are moving left or right (binary judgment), as well as the numerical
level of coherence from 0 to 50% in steps of 5%. As with the rest of the
task, dot stimuli were presented using PsychoPy software based in Py-
thon, using the built-in Dots Component function with the following
parameters: 100 total dots on the screen, 10 pixels dot size, 0.01
U/frame speed, 1000 frame dot lifetime, and noise dots follow con-
stant direction. Each dot stimulus was presented for 3 s, after which
the participant had 3 s to input their judgment by toggling left or right
on a scale that started in the middle at 0% coherence. A 2–4 s jittered
ISI followed each rating.
In the blocks that included a partner, participants saw their partner’s
judgment for 1 s before each dot stimulus in the form of an arrow point-
ing left or right (indicating the partner’s binary judgment) and a number
inside the arrow (indicating the partner’s continuous coherence judg-
ment). In blocks without a partner, a blank screen replaced the arrow for
the 1 s before the dot stimulus. Each block consisted of three dot motion
trials, including one “easy” trial (30–40% coherence), one “hard” trial
(10–20% coherence), and one “ambiguous” trial (0% coherence). There
was no difference in task difficulty or the quality of partner judgments by
partner reputation. By definition, however, there were differences in the
quality of partner judgments by partner performance levels, such that the
total error of the judgments provided by low performing partners (70–
80% total error) was higher than that of high performing partners (10–
20% total error). Subjects could select “no direction” by selecting 0%
coherence on the visual analog scale. Participants were not explicitly
instructed about the different levels of task difficulty, or the possibility
that some trials would not have a true direction left/right. They were also
not instructed on how they should use the information provided by the
partner. Accuracy was calculated from the absolute distance between the
subject’s indicated coherence and the actual coherence of the dots.
Near the end of each block was an anticipation period (4–6 s, jittered)
during which participants were instructed that they may receive an elec-
tric shock to the left wrist at any point. Before each anticipation period,
participants were given 3 s to rate their level of anxiety on a 7-point Likert
scale. Participants were told the shocks were probabilistically based on a
lower combined performance of both themselves and their partner, such
that worse combined performance was associated with a larger probabil-
ity of shock. For blocks without a partner, participants were instructed
the probability of getting a shock was based solely on their own perfor-
mance. In reality, all participants received the same number of shocks (5)
and those shocks were paired with the same partners within each of the
counterbalanced sets of partners. The shock stimuli were delivered
using a Biopac MP150 with an STM100C module (Biopac Systems).
Attached to the STM100Cwas a 200 Vmaximum stimulus isolation unit
(STMISOC, Biopac Systems). Shocks were administered via pre-gelled
radio translucent electrodes on the underside of the participant’s left
wrist and attached to the STMISOCwith shielded leads. The shocks were
calibrated for each participant before the scan with a procedure that
allowed the participant to select a shock level that was uncomfortable but
not too painful, with an upper limit of 100 V.
After the anticipation period and a 2–4 s jittered ISI there was a 3 s
feedback period. During this time, participants were shown a visual met-
ric (a partially full cylinder) ostensibly indicating the combined perfor-
mance of the partner and participant in that block. In reality this
feedback bar only reflected the partner’s performance indexed by the
amount of total error in his/her three judgments. Importantly, the part-
ner’s performance was orthogonal to the reputation rating, and both
were orthogonal to the partner’s implicit competence, gender, and race.
fMRI data acquisition.All fMRI data were acquired using a GEDiscov-
eryMR750 3.0 T scanner with 32-channel head coil. The imaging session
consisted of two function scans, each 20min, as well as a high-resolution
anatomical T1-weighted image (1 mm isotropic resolution) collected at
the beginning of each scan session. For functional imaging, interleaved
T2*-weighted gradient-echo echoplanar imaging (EPI) sequences were
used to produce 45 3-mm-thick oblique axial slices (TR 2 s, TE 25ms,
flip angle 77°, FOV 192 192mm,matrix 64 64).
fMRI data preprocessing. Structural images were subjected to the Uni-
fied Segmentation algorithm implemented in SPM8, yielding discrete
cosine transform spatial warping coefficients used to normalize (warp)
each individual’s data (structural and functional) into MNI space. After
discarding the first five volumes of each functional run to account for
equilibrium effects, the functional data were preprocessed using the fol-
lowing SPM8 functions: slice-time correction, two-pass realignment to
correct for head motion (rigid body registration of all frames to the
averaged image after first pass), coregistration of each participant’s func-
tional mean image to the corresponding structural image, followed by
applying the normalization parameters determined during segmentation
to the functional images, and then using a 6 mm FWHM Gaussian
smoothing kernel.
Statistical analysis of fMRI data.Preprocessed images were subjected to
a two-level general linear model using SPM8. The first (individual par-
ticipant) level contained the following regressors of interest, each con-
volved with the canonical two-gamma hemodynamic response function:
a 3 s boxcar function for the partner and rating presentation period, a 3 s
boxcar function for the dotmotion perception period, a 4–6 s (duration-
jittered) boxcar function for the anticipation period, and a 3 s boxcar
function for the feedback period. In addition, an orthogonal regressor
using the mean-centered anxiety ratings parametrically modulating the
anticipation period was used, as well as orthogonal regressors using
mean-centered dot motion coherence and computed conformity levels
parametrically modulating the motion perception period. Regressors of
no interest consisted of motion parameters determined during prepro-
cessing, their first temporal derivative, and discrete cosine transform-
based temporal low-frequency drift regressors with a cutoff of 192 s.
Beta (regressionweight)mapswere used to create linear contrastmaps
(weighted sums of betas), which were then subjected to several second-
level, random-effects (summary statistics) one-sample t tests, with the
null hypothesis being that the mean over all participants is zero (0). Our
model included the partner and rating presentation period (3 s), the
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motion perception period (3 trials each of 3 s), the anticipation period
(4–6 s), and the feedback period (3 s). The analyses only included antic-
ipation periodswhen a shock did not occur. The resulting statisticalmaps
(one-sample t tests) were thresholded at p 0.05, corrected for multiple
comparisons, and false discovery rate (FDR)-corrected. (Genovese et al.,
2002). Additionally, for results with strong a priori spatial hypotheses, a
small volume correction (SVC) was applied.
Statistical analysis of behavioral data.All behavioral data were analyzed
in R. The task was a 2  2 factorial design with two main independent
variables, partner reputation and partner performance. Each of these two
variables had three levels, but there were fewer instances of the midlevel
star ratings and performance bars since they were used mainly for psy-
chological validity. The low and high levels of both variables were bal-
anced and were the main conditions of interest in the analyses, therefore
the task was treated as a 2 2 factorial design for analysis of the anxiety
measures. Further, the “lmer” package in R was used for to test hypoth-
eses on the repeated-measures data with linear mixed-effect models.
With a binary-dependent variable, we used a generalized linear mixed
model with a logit link fit by maximum likelihood (“glmerMod”), which
provides z-statistics for hypothesis testing of the fixed effects. With a
continuous dependent variable, we used a linear mixed model fit by
REML (“lmerMod”), which provides t statistics using a noninteger Sat-
terthwaite approximation to degrees of freedom for the fixed effects.
Results
Partner reputation
We first analyzed the fMRI signal in response to the reputation of
the partner at the time of the initial partner screen display. The
amygdala (MNI-coordinates 18, 0, 24; p  0.020 SVC),
showed increased activity for the RepLow (1 star reputation) when
compared directly to the RepHigh (5 star reputation; Fig. 2A).
Other activated regions including the precuneus, hippocampus
and mPFC were also activated [p  0.05 whole-brain corrected
(WBC); Table 1]. No differential activity was observed for the
RepHigh condition compared with RepLow.
Partner reputation and RDM coherence estimates
Next we show that subjects were no more accurate in their judg-
ments of the RDM direction when paired with RepLow compared
with RepHigh partner (88.5% vs 86% correct; t(21)  1.14, p 
0.13; one-sample t test). The partner’s influence on participant
judgments, however, was significantly higher for RepHigh com-
pared with RepLow, based on both binary measures of social in-
fluence (whether partner and participant judgments of motion
direction match; z 2.48, p 0.01; Fig. 1B) as well as a contin-
uous measure (the absolute difference in judgments of motion
coherence; t(21)2.80, p 0.01; one-sample t test). There was
also an interaction between task difficulty and partner reputation
on the amount of social influence on perception. Task difficulty is
equated to stimulus uncertainty (lower coherence corresponds to
higher stimulus uncertainty and makes the task more difficult).
As difficulty increased, the difference in the amount of social
influence from RepHigh partner judgments, compared with Re-
Figure2. A, Neural activity associatedwith the presentation of the RepLow comparedwith RepHigh transient collaborators.B, Parametric analysis showingbrain regions associatedwith increased
dissent and conformity during the RDM task. C, dACC activity associated with increased conformity with the RepLow compared with RepHigh and inset showing overlap between regions associated
withdissent andRepLow conformity.D, Neurosynthmeta-analysis of 357 studies using the search term“Error” (cluster represent a forward inference); (E)medial PFC activity for the 22 interaction
between RepHigh/RepLow Easy/Uncertain RDM conditions.
Table 1. Brain activation for contrast low reputation> high reputation (partner
period)
Brain region Left/right Cluster size t score
Coordinates
x y z
Low reputation	 high reputation (partner)
Cerebellum R 1657 8.50 39 54 24
Precuneus L 556 8.32 3 54 15
mPFC R 253 7.77 3 57 9
Hippocampus L 130 6.37 18 6 18
Middle temporal gyrus R 61 6.26 54 0 21
Superior motor area L 82 5.44 3 6 51
Amygdala* L 14 3.56 18 0 24
All p 0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons (FDR).
*SVC correction.
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pLow, also increased (t(21)  1.79, p  0.04; one-sample t test;
Fig. 1C). When the task was easy, there was no significant differ-
ence in measures of social influence between RepHigh compared
with RepLow partners (apparently due to a ceiling effect in perfor-
mance).When the taskwas hard or ambiguous (uncertain), there
was significantly more conformity to RepHigh compared with Re-
pLow partners (t(21)3.54, p 0.001; one-sample t test).
To investigate the neural systems underlying these differing
levels of social influence between partner reputation conditions,
we looked at the fMRI data during RDM task. We first examined
the parametric changes associated with increasing conformity
and increasing dissent from the partner’s judgment (Table 2).
Increasing conformity was associated with increased activity in
the vmPFC (Fig. 2B;6, 57, 0; p 0.05;WBC; Table 3). Increas-
ing dissent was associated with increased activity in classic error
monitoring areas, namely the dACC (1, 8, 51; p  0.012 SVC
and p 0.05WBC) and the intraparietal sulcus (p 0.05WBC),
a region frequently activated during the RDM task (Fig. 2B; Table
3). The latter finding suggest that the decision to choose an esti-
mate different than the partner’s estimate, results in an error or
conflict signal (Fig. 2D). Furthermore, the dACCwasmore active
when conforming with the RepLow compared with RepHigh part-
ner (p  0.05 WBC; Table 3). This region overlapped with the
conflict/error signal observed during dissent and with the peak
regions found in ameta-analysis of neural activity using the term
“error” conducted on 357 studies in Neurosynth (Fig. 2D). Fi-
nally, a 2 (RepHigh/RepLow) 2 (Easy RDM/uncertain RDM con-
ditions) ANOVA was used to examine the neural interaction
between easy and uncertain RDM conditions and high and low
reputation. This analysis showed activity in the social cognition
network including the mPFC, temporoparietal junction (TPJ),
and temporal pole in socially influenced perceptual decision-
making (p 0.05 WBC; Table 4).
Finally, we did not observe any behavioral difference between
low reputation partner trials and no partner trials. Similarly,
when we compared the neural activations between low reputa-
tion and no partner conditions, we found no neural differences
(at p 0.5 FDR correction).
Partner reputation and threat-evoked anxiety
Being pairedwith RepLow comparedwith RepHigh resulted in sug-
gestively higher levels of subjective anxiety, assessed immediately
before the 4–6 s shock anticipation period (t(21)  3.65, p 
0.002; one-sample t test; Fig. 3A). The RepLow and RepHigh part-
ners performed equally well on average between levels of partner
reputation. By design, partner performance was manipulated or-
thogonally such that some partners performed well at the task
and others performed relatively poorly. Actual partner perfor-
mance was defined as the sum total of error (difference between
actual numerical motion coherence and partner’s judgment) in
the three perceptual judgments looped through for each stimulus.
Actual performance modulated anxiety as much as reputation did:
mean anxiety was significantly higher when the partner’s perfor-
mance was low compared with high (t(21)3.17, p 0.006; one-
sample t test). There was no interaction between partner reputation
and partner performance on anxiety.
To further investigate what caused participants’ anxiety, we
ran a multiple linear regression model with subjective anxiety
ratings as the dependent variable. The variables included as pre-
dictors were the partner’s implicit competence, reputation rating
(i.e., 1 and 5 stars), partner’s performance for the block, partici-
pant’s performance for the block, and the overall level of social
influence in the block (indexed by the total absolute difference
between partner and participant numerical coherence judg-
ments). Results of the model indicate that partner reputation,
partner performance, and amount of social influence are each
significantly associated of anxiety, whereas implicit partner com-
petence and the participant’s performance were not significantly
associated with anxiety (Fig. 3B).
Next, we analyzed the neural correlates of how partner repu-
tation affected subjective anxiety during the shock anticipation
period (trials with actual shocks were removed from the analysis;
Table 5). Being paired with a RepLow compared with a RepHigh
partner increased activity in anticipatory pain pathways, namely
the dACC and bilateral posterior insula (pINS; p  0.05 WBC;
Fig. 3C,D). We also tested whether there were regions selectively
moreor less activeduringanticipationas a functionofpartner actual
performance,butnoregions survivedmultiple-comparisonscorrec-
tion. Finally, we conducted a psychophysiological (PPI) analysis
which showed the connectivity from the pINS to dACC (p 0.05
WBC; Fig. 3E; Table 6), consistent with earlier findings about pain
pathways (Wilcox et al., 2015).
Discussion
How others influence our behavior has been the target of social
science research for decades. Based on previous research and the-
ory, we hypothesized that RepHigh partners would create greater
levels of social influence on perceptual judgments and lower anx-
iety toward a potential threat. We found that a partner’s reputa-
tion did have an impact on the perception of RDM perceptual
estimates, especially as stimulus uncertainty increased. We also
found that a partner’s reputation affected subjective and neural
measures of anxiety, and levels of a partner’s reputation were
Table 2. Brain activation for parametric modulation of conformity
Brain region Left/right Cluster size t score
Coordinates
x y z
Conformity

Fusiform R 34 5.6 24 69 12
mPFC L 182 5.53 6 57 0
Postcentral gyrus R 112 5.23 60 9 30
Insula R 115 4.97 45 3 3
All p 0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons (FDR).
Table 3. Brain activation for parametric modulation of conformity (low
reputation> high reputation)
Brain region Left/right Cluster size t score
Coordinates
x y z
Conformity
 (low–high reputation)
Caudate R 57 5.36 13 7 9
Precentral gyrus L 48 5.22 45 6 48
Superior temporal gyrus R 94 5.11 58 29 15
dACC R 203 4.97 9 23 27
All p 0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons (FDR).
Table 4. Brain activation for interaction between reputation level and task
difficulty (task period)
Brain region Left/right Cluster size t score
Coordinates
x y z
Medial frontal cortex R 1011 6.63 2 58 2
Precuneus L 371 5.51 3 62 27
TPJ L 235 5.46 47 60 28
ACC R 184 4.96 3 37 18
Insula R 150 4.85 42 36 33
All p 0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons (FDR).
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more predictive of anxiety than any other measure. Our observa-
tions build on social influence frameworks by linking the neural
representations of perceived reputation with decision-making
and emotion.
The bilateral amygdala was significantly more active when the
subjects were shown the face and reputation (i.e., number of
stars) of a RepLow compared with a RepHigh player (Fig. 2A). One
explanation for this result is that pairing with subject with a Re-
pLow partner resulted in a threat or saliency signal, potentially
associated with the increasing likelihood of diminished perfor-
mance, and hence, the increased chance of an electric shock.
Research shows that the amygdala is evoked during explicit
judgements of untrustworthiness (Adolphs et al., 1998; Winston
et al., 2002), yet these studies do not link such judgments to
behavioral outcomes. An alternative explanation might be that
the amygdala plays a role in invigorating the subject to work
harder at the task, although if this estimation true, one might
expect to see activity in the other dopamine enriched areas, such
as the ventral striatum (Pessiglione et al., 2007) which was not
observed, making this conclusion less viable. Thus, the amygdala
activity might be a signal for threat and behavioral avoidance
(Adolphs, 2010;Mobbs et al., 2013) associated with the increased
potential for harm during performance outcome.
Parametric neural activity in the dACC increased as partner–
participant perceptual conflict increased, whereas activity in a
vmPFC region increased as the amount of social influence, or
perceptual similarity, increased. In line with our findings, this
dACC region associated with dissent or social conflict, has previ-
ously been linked to conflict or error monitoring, and the more
ventral mPFC region here associated with conformity may con-
tribute to integrating socially relevant reward signals (Mobbs et
al., 2015). Indeed, themost consistent findings in fMRI studies of
conformity show the dACC to be involved in anticonformity or
dissent (Berns et al., 2005; Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010;
Izuma and Adolphs, 2013). Recent controversy has, however,
occluded the role of the dACC, including its role in motivating
effortful behavior or expected value of control (Shenhav et al.,
2013). Without directly comparing these theories empirically, it
is difficult to state the psychological role of the dACC, yet each of
these theories provides viable explanations for our data. It is also
important to note that we also found increased activity in the IPS,
Figure 3. A, Effect of partner reputation on self-report anxiety. B, Regression coefficients comparing partner reputation to other variables that potentially affect anxiety ratings. C, fMRI activity
during anxious anticipation of potential shock for RepLow compared with RepHigh. Signal change reflects activity in the (C) dACC and (D) pINS. Betas show the differences in activity for RepLow and
RepHigh for both the ambiguous (uncertain) and easy RDM conditions, using an independent ROI taken from Tedeschi et al. (2015). E, connectivity between the pINS (seed) and dACC.
Table 5. Brain activation for contrast low reputation–high reputation (shock
anticipation period)
Brain region Left/right Cluster size t score
Coordinates
x y z
Low–high reputation (anticipation)
Middle occipital gyrus L 822 8.88 21 96 6
Calcarine R 761 8.38 12 99 0
Insula R 235 7.46 44 14 3
Precentral gyrus L 625 6.84 42 18 57
Middle frontal cortex R 146 6.25 42 36 33
All p 0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons (FDR).
Table 6. Brain activation for PPI analysis (pINS seed)
Brain region Left/right Cluster size t score
Coordinates
x y z
Insula L 154 3.90 39 12 0
Middle frontal gyrus L 70 3.86 45 21 33
Precentral gyrus R 317 3.71 54 0 18
dACC L 227 3.68 3 15 39
All p 0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons (FDR).
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a region involved in perceptual judgments similar to those used
in this study (Newsome et al., 1989; Raymond, 2000; Braddick et
al., 2001), where it is possible that this reflects greater recruitment
of motion processing regions as the participant’s judgment devi-
ated from the partner’s, or equivalently, less recruitment of mo-
tion processing resources when conforming more closely.
Another key finding of this study was that the participants’
perceptions of uncertain stimuli were influenced more by
RepHigh than RepLow partners. This reputation effect interacted
with task difficulty such that participants were not influenced at
significantly different rates when the task was easy, yet as the task
difficulty (i.e., stimulus uncertainty) increased, so did the differ-
ence in levels of influence between RepHigh and RepLow partners.
This finding supports informational social influence theory, or in
our case, the tendency to trust a RepHigh partner’s judgmentwhen
the RDM task was difficult to estimate (Wooten and Reed, 1998).
The neural data showed that when the subjects conformed with
the RepLow partners, there was increased activity in the dACC,
which overlapped with overall increased dissent and a meta-
analysis of studies examining the neural basis of error. Although
this suggests an alternative view of the dACC to the parametric
analysis discussed above, it does fit with the notion that this re-
gion is involved in error monitoring or increased perceptual ef-
fort. The later theory seems unlikely, however, as activity in the
dACC did not correlate with performance (p  0.22, r  0.19).
Finally, we conducted an interaction between RepHigh/RepLow
Easy/Uncertain RDM conditions, which revealed a role for the
social cognition network, including the TPJ, mPFC, temporal
pole, and dACC (Stanley and Adolphs, 2013), suggesting that
these regions are involved in integrating social information with
perceptual judgments.
Chief among our hypotheses is the notion that a partner’s
reputation can shape subjective ratings of anxiety. Previous work
has demonstrated that when one’s risk for a shock depends on the
task performance of an unfamiliar person, the level of perceived
competence in their appearance alone, modulates subjective, and
neural measures of anxiety (Tedeschi et al., 2015). In the present
task, having a RepHigh partner alone decreased anxiety ratings
toward a possible shock compared with having a RepLow partner
or no partner at all.We also see this decrease in brain regions that
respond to the anticipation of shocks including the pINS, so-
matosensory cortex, and dACCwhere there was less activity dur-
ing the anticipation period for the RepHigh compared with the
RepLow partner. The pINS region appears to largely overlap with
the regions observed in previous pain studies (Tedeschi et al.,
2015), perhaps indicating this region, known to be involved in
interoception and pain processing (Craig, 2003a,b), is sensitive to
these two different cues of another’s reputation and, accordingly,
one’s risk of harm.
There has been a growing body of literature demonstrating a
series of social contexts that influence decision-making and cog-
nition. Studies have shown that information from experts can
enhance subsequent memory effects (Klucharev et al., 2008) and
decision-making processes (Boorman et al., 2013). Further, the
opinions of others and group membership can also modulate
choices and value judgments (Izuma et al., 2008; Campbell-
Meiklejohn et al., 2010). These contextual effects were associated
with activities in the ventral striatum, STS, and prefrontal re-
gions, which process value during social interaction (Mobbs et
al., 2015). Reputation, however, is significant because it shows
that without experience, one can be led to trust others opinions.
Reputation is likely one of many cues that drive us to conform to
others (e.g., expectations, confidence, metacognitive abilities,
and trust). Therefore, a future goal is to understand the variety of
social variables that lead people to conform to other opinions.
These findings have implications across all fields in which
people make judgments in a collectively way (e.g., in teamwork),
or are influenced by what others think and say. In politics, peer
judgments can influence voting behavior based on limited data.
In organizations, committees often make decisions about hiring
and risky investments aggregating judgments of people who
know a lot or a little. In economics and finance “herding” can be
rational; helping less-informed investors rely on superior knowl-
edge of others. In medicine, patient–practitioner interactions re-
quire patients to weigh how much their doctor knows, or to
compare initial and second opinions to avoid harmful results. In
law enforcement and combat, opinions are shared during life-
and-death decisions. Game theory goes even further, by consid-
ering the incentives of experts to misrepresent how much they
know, and howwell consumers of expert opinion adjust for these
incentives (Crawford and Sobel, 1982). Future research, there-
fore, may be able to elucidate how the effects of reputation de-
scribed here, reflect more general ways humans integrate cues
about peer knowledge in the social environment and how they
bias cognition and emotion.
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